



















We analyze how the threat of a potential future regime shift affects optimal management.  We 
use a simple general growth model to analyze four cases that involve combinations of stock 
collapse versus changes in system dynamics, and exogenous versus endogenous probabilities 
of regime shift.  Prior work has focused on stock collapse with endogenous probabilities and 
reaches  ambiguous  conclusions  about  the  effect  of  potential  regime  shift  on  optimal 
management.  We show that all other cases yield unambiguous results.  In particular, with 
endogenous probability of regime shift that affects system dynamics the potential for regime 
shift causes optimal management to become precautionary. 
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1.  Introduction 
Complex dynamic systems can undergo changes in interactions between constituent 
components that cause a shift to different system dynamics.  In ecological systems such 
“regime shifts” can cause changes in nutrient cycling and population dynamics of various 
species with consequences for the value of ecosystem services derived from the system.  For 
example, lakes may shift between oligotrophic and eutrophic conditions with impacts on 
water quality, fish populations, recreation, and aesthetics (Scheffer 1997, Carpenter et al. 
1999, Carpenter 2003).  Terrestrial systems can shift between grasslands and woodlands with 
impacts on the value of grazing and other ecosystem services (Perrings and Walker 1997, 
Janssen et al. 2004).  Coral reef systems can shift from coral dominated to algal dominated 
with impacts on water quality, fish populations, recreation and aesthetics (Hughes et al. 2003).  
At a larger scale, the global climate system may have regime shifts with potentially major 
consequences  in  several  dimensions  (e.g.,  sea  level  rise,  agricultural  production,  water 
scarcity).  Economic systems can also undergo regime shifts.  Examples include sudden shifts 
in  consumer  choices  (“fads”)  and  cultural  change  (e.g.,  Bikhchandani  et  al.  1992,  and 
popularized  by  Gladwell  2000),  shifts  in  financial  markets  due  to  changes  in  investor 
sentiment and herd behavior (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein 1990, Banerjee 1992, Brock and 
Hommes 1998) or due to changes in investor information and hedging (Genotte and Leland 
1990, Brock et al. 2009), and shifts in the macro-economy (e.g., Azariadis 1981, Cass and 
Shell 1983, Hamilton 1989, Guo et al. 2005).  Once a threshold between regimes has been 
crossed it may be difficult to reverse the process to shift back to the original regime (“system 
hysteresis”, Scheffer et al. 2001). 
In this paper we analyze optimal management of a dynamic system with the potential 
for  a  regime  shift.    To  fix  ideas,  we  focus  our  discussion  on  the  case  of  harvesting  a 
renewable resource (e.g., a fishery) in which the growth function of the stock is dependent on 
the regime and where the stock level of the resource can influence the probability of a regime 
shift.  For example, high levels of harvest can reduce fish populations that graze on plankton 
and increase the probability that a bleaching event or other disturbance will shift a coral reef 
system from coral dominated to algal dominated (Hughes et al. 2003).  The shift into a new 
regime reduces fishery productivity and may also reduce other ecosystem services (recreation, 
storm protection, etc).  The model we analyze, however, is more general than harvesting a 
renewable resource and could be used to analyze any circumstance in which management  
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actions affect probabilities of regime shift, such as greenhouse gas emissions and climate 
regime shifts, or financial regulations and the potential for sudden shifts in investor sentiment. 
     Prior research in economics on optimal management with potential regime shift has 
focused on the case of catastrophic stock collapse.  In environmental economics, this line of 
research began with Cropper (1976) who analyzed a model in which utility falls to zero once 
a threshold is crossed.
4  In Cropper’s model, the location of the threshold is unknown.  The 
probability of crossing the threshold increases in the level of pollution (or resource depletion).  
William Reed showed how to transform the optimal management problem with a probability 
of crossing a threshold, which is a stochastic dynamic problem, into a deterministic problem 
that could be solved analytically using the Pontryagin maximum principle (Reed 1987, 1988; 
and see Reed and Echavarria Heras 1992 for a useful summary).  In Reed’s approach, the 
potential for collapse has an ambiguous effect on management prior to the collapse.  The 
potential for collapse tends to increase exploitation because collapse reduces the future value 
of stocks so there is less incentive to maintain stocks.  This effect works identically to an 
increase in the discount rate and occurs for the same reason that an increase in mortality risk 
increases an individual’s discount rate.  Working in the opposite direction, however, is the 
fact that decreased exploitation results in higher stocks and lowers the probability of collapse.  
We refer to actions that lessen exploitation to reduce probabilities of bad future outcome as 
“precaution”. Combining these two effects yields an ambiguous overall result.  Reed applied 
his approach to analyze optimal management of forests subject to fire (Reed 1984, 1987, 
1989), fisheries subject to collapse (Reed 1988) and environmental pollution (Clarke and 
Reed 1994).  Threshold models have also been applied by other researchers to climate change 
(e.g., Tsur and Zemel 1996, Gjerde et al. 1999, Keller et al. 2004), environmental pollution 
(Tsur and Zemel 1998), groundwater aquifers (Tsur and Zemel 1995), and nuclear power 
(Aronsson et al. 1998).  Mäler et al. (2007) apply a similar model to generate a shadow price 
for resilience, where resilience influences the probability of regime shift.  A slightly different 
modeling approach to thresholds was taken by Nævdal (2001, 2003, 2006) who does not 
include the potential for shocks so that the probability of regime shift is positive only in time 
periods when stocks are being depleted.  Tsur and Zemel (2006, 2008) study the regulation of 
stock externalities that arise in cases of non-cooperative behavior.  In all of these models, a 
regime shift triggers a discontinuous decline in a state variable and/or value function. 
                                                 
4 Earlier, Kamien and Schwarz (1971) developed a model of machinery failure that is formally similar to models 
of environmental collapse.  
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A different approach, and one more in line with the ecological literature, is to model a 
regime shift as a change in system dynamics rather than as a sudden collapse in the stock.  
Peterson, Carpenter and Brock (2003) consider a model with two regimes (oligotrophic and 
eutrophic lake system), with state equations that differ by an additive term.  They show that 
optimal management will typically involve periodic collapse (switch from oligotrophic to 
eutrophic) and recovery (switch from eutrophic to oligotrophic).   Brozovic and Schlenker 
(2008) use a similar model of regime shift to analyze the relationship between precaution and 
variance of uncertainty and find that the relationship is not monotonic.  An increase in the 
variance  of  the  stochastic  component  of  the  natural  system  that  determines  whether  the 
threshold is crossed initially increases precaution.  However, if the variance gets very large, 
not much can be done to prevent crossing the threshold and precaution becomes too costly 
compared to the small reduction in the probability that the threshold is crossed.  Brock and 
Starrett (2003) and Mäler et al. (2003) analyze a model with a convex-concave regeneration 
function  that  captures  the  potential  for  regime  shifts.    These  models,  however,  are 
deterministic and focus on characterizing different optimal paths under various parameter 
conditions. 
  In this paper we develop a general growth model with stochastic regime shift that can 
capture changes to stock levels and/or system dynamics when a regime shift occurs.  We 
consider cases in which the probability of a regime shift is not affected by any management 
action (exogenous regime shift), and cases in which the probability of a regime shift is a 
function of management action (endogenous regime shift).  The model in this paper contains 
one important simplification.  We assume that the objective function is linear in the control 
variable, which generates a bang-bang control and allows for a relatively simple analytical 
solution. 
In  the  case  with  an  exogenous  regime  shift  that  results  in  a  change  in  system 
dynamics but not an immediate change in stock level, we show that the threat of regime shift 
does not affect optimal management prior to any potential regime shift.  With an endogenous 
regime shift that changes system dynamics, optimal management becomes precautionary in 
the sense that the potential for regime shift will cause managers to choose less intensive 
harvest  (emissions)  and  maintain  higher  resource  stocks  (environmental  quality).    These 
results  contrast  with  the  prior  literature  that  focused  on  stock  collapse  where  a  potential 
regime shift causes more intensive exploitation (in the case with exogenous regime shift) or 
ambiguous results (in the case with endogenous regime shift).  
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In the next section we set up the optimal management model with potential regime 
shifts and derive results.  The results are discussed in section 3.  We compare our results with 
prior literature and explain major differences.  We summarize our findings and include a brief 
discussion of important extensions and open questions in section 4.   
 
2.  Model 
We use a simple dynamic model with a linear objective function (constant price and 
constant marginal cost of harvest) to demonstrate results about optimal management with the 
potential for a regime shift.  The linear objective function in the control variable simplifies 
the analytics.  Other than this, however, the model is quite general.  For concreteness and to 
make comparisons with prior literature easier, we interpret the model as a renewable resource 
model.  The renewable resource can be thought of as a traditional renewable resource like a 
fishery or as an environmental resource like the global atmosphere.  Additional harvest of 
fish, or increased emission of greenhouse gases, generates extra current flow benefits but 
leads to depletion of the resource base, which pushes the system in an undesirable direction 
and makes it more likely that some shock or disturbance will cause regime shift. 
The objective is to maximize the present value of revenue from harvest, subject to 
stock dynamics 
       (1) 
where p > 0 denotes the constant net price, h(t) is the harvest level at time t, r > 0 is the 
discount rate, s(t) is the resource stock at time t, and G(s(t)) is the natural growth function of 
the resource, which depends on the resource stock.  We assume that the growth function is 
concave in stock and that G(0) = 0. 
At some future time τ (possibly infinite) there is a regime shift.  Before time τ the 
growth function is given by G1(s), with G1(s) > 0 for 0 < s < K1 and G1(s) < 0 for s > K1.  In 
the case where regime shift changes system dynamics, after time τ the growth function is 
given by G2(s), with G2(s) > 0 for 0 < s < K2 and G2(s) < 0 for s > K2. We assume that G1(s) 
> G2(s) and   for all s > 0, and K2 < K1.  Here Ki, i = 1, 2, can be thought of 
as carrying capacity, i.e. the steady-state value in the system with no harvest.  The size of the 
stock at time τ is unchanged by the regime shift. Stock dynamics are characterized by   
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  .        (2) 
A simple illustration of the effect of the regime shift for the case of logistic growth, Gi(s) = 
gs(1 - s/Ki), i = 1, 2, with g = 1,  K1 = 1 and K2 = 0.75, is shown in Figure 1. 
 
                
Figure 1:  Illustration of a reduced growth function after a regime shift. 
 
In the case where regime shift causes stock collapse, we have s(t) = 0 and G2(0) = 0 
for all t ≥ τ.  
We think of the regime shift as a future event where the time until this event occurs is 
a stochastic variable.  The standard way of modeling this is by means of a hazard rate λ.  If 
the hazard rate is constant, the time until the event occurs is drawn from an exponential 
probability distribution λe
-λx where a high λ means a high probability that the event will 
happen soon.  Alternatively, 1/λ can be seen as an indicator of the resilience of the system, 
i.e., its ability to resist shocks and maintain current productivity even with disturbance (note 
that 1/λ is the mean of the exponential probability distribution).  We will, however, also 
consider hazard rates that depend on the stock, λ(s), in order to capture the possibility that 
harvesting behavior that changes stock levels will affect the probability of a regime shift. 
In the case where regime shift causes a shift in system dynamics, we have a standard 
renewable  resource  model  with  growth  function  G2(s)  after  the  shift  has  occurred.    The 
optimal harvesting policy in this second regime can be derived with a “most rapid approach 
path” technique (Spence and Starrett 1975).  However, we shall use dynamic programming as 
that technique can also be used when analysing the first regime before the shift has occurred.   
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Except for discounting, the problem is stationary and the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation 
for the current value function V2 is given by 
.            (3) 
Because this equation is linear in h, the optimal harvest is a bang-bang control with h = 0 
when  , h infinite when  , and h indeterminate when  .  We first 
fix a maximal harvest level hm large enough to have the stock always decreasing for h = hm, 
and determine the solution V2 of this problem.  We then take the limit hm → ∞ in V2.  We will 
construct the solution in the following way.  Suppose we have a positive state s2 below the 
carrying capacity K2 with h = 0 for s < s2 and h = hm for s > s2.  If h = 0 and h = hm are the 
optimal harvest levels, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (3) yields  
 
In the limit as s approaches s2 from below, and s approaches s2 from above, equations (4a) 
and  (4b)  can  be  interpreted  as  two  equations  in  the  two  unknowns  V2(s2)  and   
(requiring the function V2 to be continuously differentiable) which leads to 
              (5) 
Differentiation and algebraic manipulation of equations (4a) and (4b) yields 
          (6) 
Assuming that  , the state s2 is determined by 
.                    (7) 
It is clear from equation (1) that 0 < V2(s) < phm/r.  Therefore, it follows from equation (6) 
and the concavity of G2(s) that   is negative for s < s2 and negative for s > s2, so that 
 is decreasing throughout.  With equation (5), this implies that   for s < s2 and 
 for s > s2, so that h = 0 and h = hm are indeed the optimal harvest levels for s < s2 
and s > s2, respectively.  All the conditions of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (3) are 
satisfied.  The structure of the optimal solution in the second regime is clear now.  It consists 
of the steady-state path s = s2, where s2 is determined by equation (7), with h = G2(s2), either  
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preceded by a path with h = 0 (if we start at a stock s below s2) or by a path with h = hm (if 
we start at a stock s above s2).   
Equation  (7)  is  the  standard  “golden  rule”  of  growth.    The  value  function  V2 i s  
explicitly given by 
,        (8) 
where t0(s) and tm(s) can be interpreted as the times needed to reach s2 from s with h = 0 and 
h = hm, respectively.  These satisfy   and  . We now 
take the limit of the value function V2 for s > s2, given by equation (8), for hm → ∞.  It is 
clear that tm(s) → 0.  Furthermore, since limx→0 (1-e
-x)/x = 1, we have 
.    (9) 
In the limit, the value function V2(s) for s > s2 takes the form 
.            (10) 
In the limit for hm → ∞, the difference (s - s2) is harvested instantaneously and sold at price p. 
Deriving the value function in the case where a regime shift causes a stock collapse is 
trivial since s(t) = 0, so that h(t) = 0 for all t ≥ τ.  Therefore, we have V2(s) = 0 for all s. 
We  now  consider  the  first  regime.  Harvest  levels  h  must  maximize  the  expected 
present value of net revenue 
      (11) 
where τ is a stochastic variable.  For a constant hazard rate λ, with an exponential probability 
distribution for the point in time τ, deriving the optimal solution using a Pontryagin approach 
is straightforward (see the appendix).  However, we want to consider the possibility that the 
hazard rate λ is not constant and that it depends on the stock s.  This can be solved with a 
Pontryagin  approach  as  well  (see  the  appendix)  but  we  prefer  to  develop  the  Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation for the value function in the first regime, directly using the hazard 
rate, because the analysis is more transparent. 
  Starting at time t with stock s we can approximate the probability of a regime shift in 
a small time period Δt by λ(s(t))Δt, which is in fact the basic definition of the hazard rate λ.   
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The value function, W1(s,t), is the maximal expected value of the objective function at time t 
for stock s and can therefore be written as 
.      (12) 
We use the symbol W because we want to use the symbol V when we eliminate the factor e
-rt 
from the resulting Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation below.  By approximating the integral 
and moving the left-hand side of equation (12) to the right-hand side and dividing by Δt, we 
get 
.        (13) 
Taking the limit of equation (13) for Δt→0 yields 
  .   (14) 
Except for discounting, the problem is stationary again.  By defining V1(s) = e
rtW1(s,t), the 
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the first regime becomes 
  .      (15) 
The structure of equation (15) is the same as the structure of equation (3).  The optimal 
harvest in the first regime is a bang-bang control as well, with h = 0 when  , h 
infinite when  , and h indeterminate when  .  Again, we first impose the 
restriction 0 ≤ h ≤ hm.  As before we search for a positive state s1, below the carrying capacity 
K1, with h = 0 for s < s1 and h = hm for s > s1, so that all the conditions of the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation (15) are satisfied.  If h = 0 and h = hm are the optimal harvest levels, 
equation (15) yields 
 
In the limit as s approaches s1 from below, and s approaches s1 from above, equations (16a) 
and (16b) yield two equations in the two unknowns V1(s1) and V1’(s1) (requiring the function 
V1 to be continuously differentiable) which leads to 
.           (17) 
Differentiation of equations (16a) and (16b) yields  
11 
 
            (18) 
where 
.     (19) 
In order for h = 0 and h = hm to be the optimal harvest levels, we need that   for s < 
s1 and   for s > s1.  As a consequence, with equation (17), we need the left limit and 
the right limit of   at s = s1 to be less than or equal to 0.  It follows from equation (18) 
that this is equivalent to f(s) ≤ 0 for s < s1 and f(s) ≥ 0 for s > s1, so that the state s1 must 
satisfy f(s1) = 0 or, using equations (19) and (17), 
.      (20) 
The difficulty here is that we cannot generally show that f(s) < 0 for s < s1 and f(s) > 0 for s 
> s1,  as  we  had  in  the  analysis  of  the  second  regime.    It  is  reasonable  to  assume  that 
,  because  the  resilience  1/λ(s)  should  increase  if  the  stock  s  increases,  and  that 
.  Furthermore, we assume that  .  This guarantees that f(0) < 0 
and f(K1) > 0, so that the function f is zero and switches sign from negative to positive 
somewhere on the interval (0, K1).  Note, however, that the function f may have multiple 
zeros.  If f switches from positive to negative, the solution of equation (20) separates areas 
where h = hm to the left and h = 0 to the right.  These points are not stable.  We cannot rule 
out the existence of more than one stable steady state, however, so that the optimal solution 
may depend on the initial state.  If there is an interval of singular states, instead of an isolated 
one, we need to have   on that interval.  It follows from equation (15) that equation 
(17) and thus equation (20) have to hold on that interval.  This is generally not possible.  In 
what follows, we will focus on the smallest steady state s1, satisfying equation (20) with f(s) 
< 0 for s < s1 and f(s) > 0 for s > s1 in some neighborhood of s1.  The function V1 satisfying 
the differential equation (16), with initial condition (17), solves the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman 
equation (15) in this neighborhood.  It follows that the optimal solution here consists of a 
steady-state path s = s1, with h = G1(s), either preceded by a path with h = 0 (if we start at a 
stock s below s1) or by a path with h = hm (if we start at a stock s above s1).  
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Equation (20) is the “golden rule” of growth when there is the possibility of a regime 
shift.  Our results will follow directly from this golden rule so that we do not give an explicit 
expression for the value function V1 where hm → ∞.
5  
 
3.  Results 
We  can  use  the  results  of  the  analysis  summarized  in  equation  (20)  to  provide  a 
characterization of the effects of regime shift on optimal management.  We distinguish four 
cases:  a) exogenous regime shift with stock collapse, b) endogenous regime shift with stock 
collapse,  c)  exogenous  regime  shift  with  changed  system  dynamics,  and  d)  endogenous 
regime shift with changed system dynamics. 
 
Case 1: Exogenous regime shift with stock collapse 
With a constant hazard rate λ and a stock collapse, we have that   and V2 = 0 so that 
the condition for the steady-state stock prior to a regime shift (as shown in equation (20)) 
becomes 
                  (21) 
This result shows that potential future regime shift increases the discount rate leading to a 
lower steady-state stock than without the possibility of collapse. 
 
Case 2: Endogenous regime shift with stock collapse 
If the hazard rate λ depends on the stock s, the condition for the steady-state stock prior to a 
regime shift with potential total stock collapse V2 = 0 becomes 
              (22) 
In this case we have two effects and the net effect is ambiguous (note that  ).  The 
effect  shown  in  Case  1  above  (the  addition  of  the  term  )  will  tend  to  increase  the 
intensity of harvest and decrease the steady-state stock.  However, the desire to avoid a 
regime shift will tend to decrease the intensity of harvest and increase the steady-state stock 
because  the  final  term   in  equation  (22)  is  negative.  The  overall  effect  is 
ambiguous.  The effect of the potential regime shift on steady-state stock will depend on 
                                                 
5 The expressions are available from the authors upon request.  
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which effect dominates.  The previous literature has focused on this case (e.g., Reed 1988, 
Clarke and Reed 1994, Tsur and Zemel 1996).   
 
Case 3: Exogenous regime shift with changed system dynamics 
If the hazard rate λ is constant and the regime shift causes a shift in system dynamics we have 
that   and   so that the condition for the steady-state stock prior to a regime 
shift becomes 
                    (23) 
The steady-state stock in this case is the same as without the possibility of a regime shift.  An 
exogenous probability of regime shift that causes a change in system dynamics, but not an 
immediate change in stock levels, will not change optimal management.  Note that s1 is larger 
than s2 (determined by equation (7)) because of the conditions on the growth functions G1 
and G2 in section 2.  If the regime shift occurs, management will adjust to the new situation, 
with a lower steady-state value.  However, prior to regime shift it is optimal to manage 
according to the current (not future) conditions. 
 
Case 4: Endogenous regime shift with changed system dynamics 
If  the  hazard  rate  λ  depends  on  the  stock  s  and  a  regime  shift  causes  a  shift  in  system 
dynamics, the condition for the steady-state stock prior to a regime shift becomes 
            (24) 
which can be rewritten as 
           (25) 
The term between brackets is positive which can be seen as follows.  With initial state s1, the 
objective in (11) is maximized by h = G1(s1).  It follows that 
  (26) 
V1(s1) must be larger than V2(s1) because the maximizing h = G1(s1) must give a larger value 
than implementing the optimal harvesting policy for the second regime from the beginning.  
It follows that the term between brackets in equation (25) is positive.  Furthermore, because 
, it is clear now that  , so that optimal management is precautionary in 
this case: the potential for a regime shift will decrease the harvest rate and increase the  
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steady-state stock level.  How much the steady-state stock will increase under precautionary 
optimal management depends on the difference between the growth functions (G1(s) and 
G2(s)), on the probability characteristics of the regime shift (λ(s)), and on the discount rate (r). 
 
4.  Discussion 
As we demonstrated above, for the case when regime shift causes a shift in system 
dynamics and when management actions influence the probability of a shift from a desirable 
to an undesirable regime, optimal management involves precautionary actions that reduce the 
probability  of  regime  shift.    This  result,  where  uncertainty  regarding  potentially  harmful 
future consequences leads to actions that reduce potential risks, accords with much recent 
writing in environmental and resource management on the “Precautionary Principle” (e.g. 
Lauck et al. 1998, Raffensperger and Tickner 1999).  To date, the Precautionary Principle has 
lacked  rigorous  justification  except  under  rather  limited  conditions  (Gollier  et  al.  2000). 
However, with an exogenous probability of regime shift (i.e., when management actions do 
not affect the probability of regime shift) and where the regime shift affects system dynamics 
but does not cause stock collapse, optimal management prior to regime shift is unaffected by 
the potential for regime shift.  Once a regime shift has occurred, management will be adjusted 
to fit the new conditions.  Any change in management prior to the regime shift involves a loss 
of profit from failing to satisfy the golden rule of growth in the initial regime. 
  These results contrast with prior results in the literature that show that the potential for 
a catastrophic collapse in stock will cause either an increase in exploitation (which is the 
opposite of precautionary action) or an ambiguous effect.  In the models of catastrophic 
collapse  of  a  renewable  resource  such  as  a  fishery,  the  collapse  causes  the  stock  of  a 
renewable resource to fall, with either no future harvest or an eventual recovery to pre-crash 
conditions.  In either event, the collapse causes the destruction of a valuable asset.  Knowing 
that  there  is  some  potential  for  asset  destruction,  a  manager  will  be  more  aggressive  in 
harvesting the resource in order to gain profits prior to potential destruction.  So, for example, 
the risk of a forest fire that would destroy timber assets gives an incentive for a landowner to 
harvest timber sooner than if there were no risk of fire (Reed 1984).  This stock effect works 
to increase the manager’s discount rate in the same way that an increase in risk of mortality 
increases the discount rate for an individual.  The increase in the discount rate shifts optimal 
management towards immediate consumption and away from savings and investment.   
  We  summarize  the  differences  between  our  results  where  regime  shift  leads  to 
changes in system dynamics and the prior literature on stock collapse in Table 1.  Regime  
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shifts with changes in system dynamics (but no stock effect) do not cause a change in optimal 
management by themselves (Case III).  Only if management actions lead to changes in the 
probability of a regime shift (via changes in the state of the system) will the potential for 
regime  shift  lead  to  changes  in  optimal  management  (Case  IV).    In  this  case,  optimal 
management is to become precautionary in the sense that a threat of future regime shift will 
cause managers to reduce current harvests and increase the stock of the resource.  For climate 
change, this would mean that consideration of the potential of future regime shifts should 
cause a decrease in current emissions of greenhouse gases. In contrast, the potential for stock 
collapse itself causes a shift in optimal management towards more aggressive exploitation 
(Case I).  With endogenous probabilities, management tends to become more precautionary, 
but whether this is sufficient to override the stock effect is ambiguous (Case II). 
  
Table 1: Comparison of models and results 
  Exogenous  Probability  of 
Regime Shift 
Endogenous  Probability  of 
Regime Shift 









We have assumed that if the regime shift occurs, it is a once and for all shift. In reality, 
however, it is likely that there will be potential for the regime to shift back again to the 
original regime or for it to shift between a number of different regimes.  Analyzing these 
possibilities implies a more complicated analysis with a series of nested Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equations with value functions characterizing the different regimes.  Doing so will 
change the results, of course, but not the logic that we find in our simple model above with 
only one potential regime shift.  Another potentially fruitful avenue for future research is to 
extend the model of uncertainty.  Using a hazard rate is a very convenient approach and it 
captures many important features of the problem.  This approach, however, does not allow 
for endogenous learning about probabilities of regime shift with additional experience or with 
active experimentation.  Incorporating the option to learn would be an interesting extension 
of the approach.  Finally, our model assumes constant prices and abstracts from costs that 
change with harvest or stock levels.  Having a non-linear objective function in the control  
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variable would make the model more difficult to solve.  In principle such a model could be 
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Appendix 1  
a) Constant hazard rate 
In the first regime with carrying capacity K1, starting from stock levels that are higher 
than s2, harvest levels h must maximize the expected value of the revenue 
              (A1) 
subject to stock dynamics with growth function G1.  For a constant hazard rate λ we can 
easily write this expected value as follows: 
          (A2) 
or, by changing the order of integration, 
        (A3) 
which leads to 
            (A4) 
The current value Pontryagin function for this problem reads as 
          (A5) 
Maximizing with respect to the harvest h yields that h = 0, if p < µ, h = ∞, if p > µ, and h is 
singular, if p = µ.  If the optimal harvest is singular on a time interval, we have there the 
condition µ(t) = p for the co-state µ.  From the co-state equation  
        (A6) 
it follows that on such an interval 
              (A7) 
for a constant s with h = G1(s).  Case 1 and case 3 follow immediately. 
 
b) Variable hazard rate 
  With the hazard function λ given by 
          (A8) 




       (A9) 
so that the cumulative distribution function S
c for the time τ of the regime shift becomes 
          (A10) 
This yields as expected value of the revenue 
          (A11) 
or, by changing the order of integration, 
 
or 
      (A12) 
which leads to 
          (A13) 
It is convenient to introduce a second state variable q by 
          (A14) 
Assuming that the hazard rate λ is a function of the stock s, the current value Pontryagin 
function for this problem reads as 
    (A15) 
Maximizing with respect to the harvest h yields that h = 0, if e
-qp < µ, h = ∞, if e
-qp > µ, and 
h is singular, if e
-qp = µ.  If the optimal harvest is singular on a time interval, we have there 
the condition µ(t) = e
-q(t)p for the co-state µ.  From the co-state equation in µ  
       (A16) 
with 
            (A17) 
it follows, after eliminating the co-state µ and multiplying with  e
q(t), that at each time t  
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    (A18) 
Differentiating this equation with respect to time t for a constant s yields 
    (A19) 
From this and the co-state equation in σ  
        (A20) 
it follows that at each time t  
            (A21) 
Using this equation to eliminate e
qσ from (A18) and substituting h = G1(s) finally leads to 
      (A22) 




In this appendix, we prove a verification theorem for the value function V1 constructed in the 
main part of the article. Recall that the function V1 satisfies the following properties: it is 
continuous and at least piecewise continuously differentiable. Moreover, there are finitely 
many points 
 
    
€ 
0 = s  1
(0) ≤ s1
(1) ≤ s  1
(1) ≤≤ s1
(n) ≤ s  1






V1ƹ′(s) > p if s  1
(i−1) < s < s1
(i),
V1ƹ′(s) = p if s = s1
(i),
V1ƹ′(s) < p if s1




Only at the points 
€ 
s = s  1
(i),   
€ 
i =1,, n −1, the function V1 may fail to be differentiable. It is 











Note that the points 
€ 
s1
(i) are precisely those points at which the function f , defined in the 










f (s) ≥0 if 
€ 
s≥ s1
(i). It follows from this that the harvesting rule 
€ 
h
* solving the maximisation in (A23) is 





*(s) = 0 if s  1
(i−1) < s < s1
(i),
h
*(s) = G s1
(i) ( ) if s = s1
(i),
h
*(s) = hM if s1






s = s  1





*(s) = 0, hM { } if V1 is not differentiable at s = s1
(i),
h
*(s) = G s  1
(i) ( ) otherwise.
 
 
In the first case, the decision maker is indifferent between two distinct actions; and such a 
point is called an indifference point (or Skiba point, or DNS(S) point: see Grass et al. (2008)). 
 
 




˙  s = G1(s) − h
*(s) 
 
with initial condition 
€ 









−rτV2(s(τ)) ( ) 
 
We shall show that 
€ 
h




h = h(t)be an admissible harvesting schedule, and let 
€ 
s = s(t) satisfy 
€ 
















−rτV2(s(τ)) ( )             (A24) 
 





*(s(t))      a.e. 
 







(1), s  1
(1),, s1
(n), s  1
(n) { }. 
 
and we make the following fundamental observation. The subset of continuously 
differentiable harvesting schedules is dense in the set of all schedules, as is the smaller subset 




ƹ′  h (t) ≠ 0 whenever s(t) ∈ Σ;                (A25) 
 
 
here s is the stock evolution associated to the schedule h. The latter property is an 
easy consequence of Sard’s theorem (see e.g. Arnol’d, 1988).  
 













∫ (ph + λV2)dt
0
∞ ∫ .    (A26) 
 
By the observation above, if there is a harvesting schedule for which (A24) is violated, then  
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there is another continuously differentiable schedule 
€ 
h = h(t) satisfying (A25), which also 
violates (A24). Given this schedule, let 
€ 




























∫ V1ƹ′(G1 − h) −(r+ λ)V1 ( ).         (A27) 
 
All arguments (t) and s(t) are suppressed in this equation for readability. There 
is an increasing sequence 
 
    
€ 




s = s(t)∉ Σ if 
€ 
t ≠ t j, for any j. Note that since the elements of Σ are isolated, the 
sequence 
€ 
{t j} has no accumulation points. Integrating the identity (A27) from 
€ 




















∫ V1ƹ′(G1 − h) −(r+ λ)V1 ( ) t j−1
t j ∫ dt.
 
 








∫ V1ƹ′(G1 − h) −(r+ λ)V1 ( ) 0
∞ ∫ dt.          (A28) 












t ∫ (ph+λV2 −λV1 −rV1+V1ƹ′(G1 −h))dt
0
∞ ∫ .





* solves the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, subtracting equation (A23) from  
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t j−1 <t <t j, then either 
€ 
V1ƹ′ > p and 
€ 
0 = h
* ≤ h, or 
€ 
V1ƹ′ < p and 
€ 
hm = h
* ≥ h. 




* −h)≤ 0 
 








−rτV2(s(τ)) ( ) −V1(s0) ≤ 0, 
 
contradicting the violation of (A24). 
 
 
 